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INTRODUCTION
Securities markets are a means of raising capital. The better they
perform, the more likely savors will be to supply capital, thereby
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reducing the costs of capital to industry, which will also be motivated
to seek capital from the public.' Securities markets also represent an
avenue for investment promotion. Securities could provide higher
return to investors than other financial assets, which encourages
financial saving, channels it into productive investment, and
promotes growth. Securities trading, thus, contributes to the
"liquidity" and "efficiency" of the market.2 Moreover, securities
markets provide business financing without the drawbacks of
borrowing. 3 These benefits make the introduction of an efficient
securities market vital to the success of the economy.4

1. Other capital-raising techniques include commercial loans and direct
investments. See Dipak Dasgupta & Dilip Ratha, What Factors Appear to Drive
Private CapitalFlows to Developing Countries? And How Does Official Lending
Respond 1-2 (The World Bank, Pol'y Research Working Paper No. 2392, 2000).
The securities literature often assumes that stock trades are mutually beneficial.
From the Jordanian perspective, direct investment may be perceived by the general
population as a "Western takeover."
2. See

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE

112 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (1776). A
basic principle of economics is that voluntary exchange is efficient because it helps
move resources to those who value them most highly, as measured by willingness
to pay. Id. The classic statement of this proposition is, of course, Adam Smith's
discussion of the "invisible hand." Id.
3. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate
Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 96 (1995) ("While placing
banks in positions of exceptional power over their borrowers may be optimal for
banks, but it may not be optimal for the rest of society."). Direct lending by
commercial banks, as the only means of capital raising, gives the banks a dominant
position in the corporate governance system. Id. at 81. Germany and Japan are
examples of such a system. See id. at 81-83, 87 (contrasting the Japanese system of
bank oversight with the U.S. system of market corporate control). The banks may
use their dominant power over corporate governance to prevent companies from
undertaking risky projects. See id. at 95-96 (explaining that banks avoid risk, in
part, due to their highly leveraged capital structure).
4. But see Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure,and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 615 n.10 (1995)
(recollecting that John Maynard Keynes equated stock markets to casinos, and
opined that "society might be significantly better off with less stock trading").
Other contemporary scholars agree with Keynes' proposition, arguing that the
social costs of stock markets outweigh the benefits. Id. They charge that stock
trading leads to a waste of resources because short-term speculation is socially
destructive. Id. at 620. Despite the criticism directed toward the securities market,
there is general enthusiasm for deregulation and unfettered competition, and many
scholars admire the efficiency of financial markets. Id. at 620-21.
WEALTH OF NATIONS
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Efficient securities markets are especially instrumental to the sale
of state-owned enterprises in the Middle East.5 They can facilitate the
valuation of these enterprises through objective, comparable
valuation measures and generate public support for privatization
because they serve as a forum for the transfer of companies into the
hands of investors. Based on the perceived benefits of a securities
market worldwide and in the Middle East, in particular, Jordan's
dilemma is not whether it should have a securities market; rather, the
dilemma is how Jordan should regulate securities trading and to what
extent regulation will successfully jumpstart a viable securities
market.
Numerous issues are involved in the creation of a securities
market.6 However, this Article will focus specifically on securities
law. Accordingly, the Article will give a brief account of the history
of securities regulation in Jordan. It will then analyze the statutory
provisions of the current securities law and explore the key issues in
greater depth. The Article compares Jordanian securities law with
U.S. and other foreign laws where appropriate. 7 Finally, the Article
concludes by arguing that Jordanian securities law is far from
complete and suggesting ways in which Jordanian can improve its
securities market.

5. See John H. Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East:
A Primerfor U.S. Companies, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 413, 427-28, 444-47 (2005)
(observing that Jordan is pressing forward with economic reforms, including
privatization programs and investment reforms to liberalize trade).
6. See Committee Presents Report to King Abdullah Proposing Changes
Needed to Jordan's FinancialMarket, JORDAN TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000. To set up a
securities market, King Abdullah's special committee identified several necessary
elements including the following: (1) promoting the establishment of savings
institutions, such as insurance companies and the Social Security Corporation;
(2) clarifying the role of government agencies, such as the Ministry of Industry and
Trade and the Jordan Securities Commission; (3) eliminating barriers in banking
laws; (4) reforming company law; (5) reforming tax laws; and (6) restructuring the
judiciary.
7. See Jordan Securities Commission Draws on US' SEC Expertise, JORDAN
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004 (asserting that Jordanian officials have received assistance
from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which is viewed as "the
world's renowned leader in securities regulation and oversight"). The SEC's 70
years of experience makes it "uniquely qualified" to assist Jordan in developing its
securities regulation regime. Id.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE
JORDANIAN SECURITIES MARKET
Despite the absence of a specific legal structure to govern it,
Jordan developed a primitive system of trading in securities well
before the creation of a formalized securities market. In the 1930s,
the Jordanian public already transacted shares of public companies. 8
The first corporate bonds were issued in the early 1960s. The market
of shares and bonds had an enormous impact on the Jordanian capital
markets; it created, for the first time, the nucleus of a securities
industry.
The unorganized nature of trading in securities prompted the
Jordanian government to contemplate the idea of setting up a formal
market to regulate the issuance of securities in a manner that would
ensure "safe, speedy and easy trading, and protect small savors
through a mechanism that would define a fair price based on supply
and demand." 9 Therefore, the government proposed economic plans
establishing an organized securities market and businesses within
Jordan commenced preparation of the market.' 0 In the 1970s, studies
conducted by the Central Bank and the World Bank's International
Finance Corporation ("IFC") concluded that "the size of the national
economy and the share of the private sector in it through public
shareholding companies and its broad investor base" made the
creation of a formalized securities market necessary. The Jordanian
government and businesses believed that such a market would
facilitate economic growth and stimulate economic activity.

8. See Official Website of Amman Stock Exchange, Establishment of the

Amman Financial Market, http://www.ase.com.jo/pages.php?menuid= 151 &local
_type=0&localid=0&local details=0#1 (noting that the first publicly held
companies to be established in Jordan were the Arab Bank in 1930, Jordan
Tobacco and Cigarettes in 1931, Jordan Electric Power in 1938, and Jordan

Cement Factories in 1951).
9. Id. Prior to the creation of a formal securities market, the legal system in
Jordan was not well suited for a developing capital market. Primary offerings were
under-regulated and the government had not enacted legal provisions covering
anti-competitive behavior such as insider trading, market manipulation, or
deceptive marketing. Furthermore, there was no regulatory scheme for market
intermediaries and no professional or regulatory oversight of meaningful,

continuing disclosure to investors.
10. Id.
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After a tortuous drafting process, the government in 1976 enacted
Temporary Law No. 31, which created the Amman Financial Market
("AFM")." Soon after, in 1977, the Jordanian cabinet established an
AFM Administration Committee, which began work almost
immediately. From its inception, "AFM was entrusted with a dual
task, namely the role of a securities and exchange commission and
the role of a traditional stock exchange.""2
The modernization of the legal rules governing the capital market
is key to economic development. Therefore, in 2002, Jordan enacted
its Securities Law, ushering in a new era of capital market
regulation. 3 During the past five years, the stock exchange in Jordan
has been the site of fervent activity. Shares of 229 companies are
actively being traded. 4 The total market capitalization is $32.9
billion and the market Price/ Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) is 19.8. This
amount of capitalization qualified Jordan as one of the largest
securities market in the Middle East region. 5 The securities market
in Jordan is,
to some extent, internationalized. 6 This
internationalization has increased the availability of funds from
foreign investors. The Jordan securities market's journey of
unprecedented development merits an examination of the Securities
Law.

1l. Id.
12. Id.
13. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 1 (Jordan), available at
http://www.jsc.gov.jo/SecuritiesLaw.asp.
14. This figure was reached by looking to the Amman Stock Exchange
provided in the July 2007 edition of the Banks in Jordan magazine.
15. See United International Press, Jordan: Foreign Investment Reaches Record
Levels, Jan. 20, 2008, http://www.unitedinternationalpress.com/Jordan2/orf.html
(quoting the CEO of the ASE as stating that "among the regional stock markets,
Jordan has the largest market capitalization as percent of GDP").
16. Sales of outstanding issues to non-Jordanians grew to 1.2936 billion
Jordanian dinars in 2007, and purchases of outstanding issues from non-Jordanians
grew to 787.4 million Jordanian Dinar in 2007. See generally Official Website of
Amman Stock Exchange, Foreign Investment: Foreign Investment Activity
(January 2006-January 2008), http://www.ase.com.jo. Several reasons could
explain this trend in the Jordanian market. For instance, advances in
communications technology in the processing of transactions facilitated the trading
of securities and the settlement of transactions. Deregulation in areas, such as
foreign exchange controls and reduced restrictions on participation by investors in
the Jordanian securities market, also served to facilitate the internationalization.
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II. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE SECURITIES
LAW OF 2002
It should be noted from the outset that securities regulation in
Jordan is different from the traditional regulatory model existing in
developed countries. While securities regulation in the United States
and the United Kingdom primarily responds to changing conditions
in existing markets,1 7 Jordanian regulation is designed to assist in
building and developing the market. Therefore, it should anticipate,
rather than respond to, market needs.
The Jordanian Securities Law of 2002 lies in 124 articles divided
into twelve chapters. Furthermore, the government has promulgated
several regulations to implement the law."8 The Securities Law and
implementing regulations establish an independent market regulator,
govern the licensing of brokers, mandate public disclosure from
issuers, and regulate other aspects of securities trading. This Section
will analyze the main features of the Securities Law.
A.

SCOPE OF THE SECURITIES LAW

A complete understanding of any statutory scheme requires
attention to definitions of operative terms. The most important terms
are "security" and, to a lesser extent, "offer."
As is clear from its title, the Securities Law regulates transactions
in securities. Securities enjoy several characteristics: Securities,
unlike goods, are created rather than produced; they have no intrinsic
value and are merely chosen in action, namely, legally enforceable
17. See John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral

Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1015, 1019 (2001) (discussing how misconduct on the part of bankers and
businesses caused the stock market crash precipitating the Great Depression, and
how the U.S. government developed securities laws resulting in the wake of the
crash); see also Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate
Scandals, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 367, 382-85 (2005) (describing the reforms to
securities laws that the U.S. government enacted in the wake of the Enron scandal).
18. Legislation is customarily written to provide the general framework.
Regulations are enacted to implement statutes and basic law, and to add some
detail to many of the matters left outstanding by the legislation. Regulations cannot
change, add, or amend the provisions of the legislation. The drafting of
implementing regulations is done either pursuant to an entrustment clause in an
enacting law or by an issuing department.
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rights or interests in something else-they convey upon their holders
9
an interest either as owners or creditors of the issuer.
Whether an instrument is a security is often the threshold issue in
determining whether or not the Securities Law applies. The law
defines the term "security" by first enumerating a list of specific
types of instruments that are, per se, considered securities.20 For
example, securities include stocks, bonds, other debt instruments
issued by the government or public institutions, and investment units
issued by investment funds. The list ends in a "catchall" phrase,
which empowers the regulatory body to expand on the definition as it
sees fit.2' The statute includes a second step: a short list of exempted
instruments that fall outside the category of securities and which are
not regulated by the Jordan Securities Commission ("JSC").2 The
list includes commercial papers, documentary credits, money
transfers, instruments exclusively traded among banks, and insurance
policies. 3
As noted above, the Securities Law of 2002 adopts a traditional
approach by defining the term "security" and then broadly empowers
the JSC to expand this definition through its rulemaking power. The
list approach is flexible as it allows the administrative body to adapt
to changes and innovations in the market. For example, the JSC
could bring investment contracts within the coverage of the
Securities Law. The strength of the laundry list approach adopted in
the Jordanian Securities Law is that it removes the question of what a
security is from the courts and legislature, and places it in the hands
of the administrative body governing the securities market. Thus, the
Securities Law of 2002 does not utilize a judicially evolving
definition of "security," as is the case in the United States. 24 The
19. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 114 (noting the privileges
enjoyed by securities, including the "finality and conclusiveness of securities
trades in stock exchanges").
20. Id. art. 3(B).
21. Id. art. 3(B)(9) (including, in the definition of securities, any right to
acquire any of the other types of securities mentioned in the list, subject to
approval by the Board of the Securities Commission).
22. Id. art. 4.
23. Id. art. 4.
24. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 64-69

(5th ed. 2005) (explaining that courts have used various tests for determining
whether a security exists because of the very broad definition of security in the
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Jordanian judicial system lacks the capacity to deal with complex
financial matters. 2 Therefore, the JSC's administration of the law
through a rulemaking process creates the best shot of creating a
functional system. Investors seeking to enter the Jordanian securities
market can enjoy certainty as to which instruments and transactions
the law regulates.
An offer is defined in the Securities Law as any communication
that has the effect of selling a security or offering it for sale.26 This
definition excludes preliminary negotiations among underwriters.
Rather than attempt to define the exact situations where an offer does
or does not occur, the Securities Law uses an effect-based definition
that covers all situations where the communication has the effect of
offering to sell a security. This expansive definition eschews the
intent-based formula of U.S. securities law in favor of an objective
standard. 2 The JSC will play a vital role in determining whether
there has been an offer or not.
Issuers do not have to conduct offerings of securities by
themselves. Underwriting professionals, such as investment bankers,
can be involved in the issuance process. According to the Securities
Law, an underwriter is a person who administers the "issuance and

U.S. securities law). Courts have found a range of items to be "securities,"
including scotch whiskey, self-improvement courses, cosmetics, pooled litigated
funds, and fruit trees. Id.
25. See generally ADEL OMAR SHERIF & NATHAN J. BROWN, JUDICIAL
IN THE ARAB WORLD, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
INDEPENDENCE
PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION (2003), available at
http://www.pogar.org/publications/j udiciary/sherif/jud-independence.pdf (pointing
out that judicial independence is important for the "development of healthy and
sound economies" and noting that most Arab countries do not yet have judiciaries
that are free from the influence of the executive branch).
26. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 2 (defining a public offer as "any
bid for the sale of any security to more than 30 persons of the public").
27. See J. Colin Sullivan, Note, SEC Offshore Press Conference Safe Harbors:
Lack of Objectivity Leads to Uncertainty and Ineffective Rulemaking, 23 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 177, 184-85 (2005) (explaining that, under U.S. securities law, an offer
is everything that, even though not couched in terms of an express offer, conditions
the public mind or arouses public interest in the particular securities). Further,
actions that are calculated-by arousing and stimulating investor and dealer
interest in the issuer's securities, and by eliciting indications of interest from
customers to dealers and from dealers to underwriters-set in motion the
distribution process, and thus are offers. See id. at 185-86.
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marketing of securities on behalf of the Issuer. '28 The involvement of
underwriters in the issuance process makes the process efficient and
aids the development of the securities market in Jordan.
B. THE KEY INSTITUTIONS OPERATING IN THE SECURITIES
MARKET

The capital market of Jordan comprises, inter alia, a primary
securities market and a secondary securities market. 29 The former
describes a market in which new securities are sold, hence its
association with initial public offerings ("IPO"), while a secondary
market is one in which investors trade outstanding issues of
securities.30 The distinction can be drawn through an assessment of
their functions. The primary market is used to raise new capital for
enterprises, while the secondary market provides required liquidity
for investors to arrange their portfolios to best meet their individual
needs. The trading of listed securities in Jordan is currently the
domain of Amman Stock Exchange.
The central feature of the restructuring effort advanced by the
Securities Law of 2002 was the separation of the supervisory and
legislative roles from the executive role in the capital market. The
law left the latter role to the private sector's Securities Depository
Center, while it entrusted the supervisory and legislative roles to the
Jordan Securities Commission and Amman Stock Exchange.
Therefore, the capital market in Jordan consists of an intertwined

28. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 2.
29. See Directives for Listing Securities on the Amman Stock Exchange for the
Year 2004, arts. 17-19 (Jordan), available at http://www.ase.com.jo/pages.
[hereinafter
php?menu id= 121 &localtype=O&localid=0&localdetails=0
Listing Securities Directive] (defining the meaning of market types in Jordan, such
as secondary market, first market, bonds market, and funds market). An emerging,
but important, component of the capital market in Jordan is the bond market; this
market is composed of both government securities and corporate papers. Id. It is
essential for these debt securities to be listed. There is also trading of financial
futures and options which is conducted through the ASE. The availability of these
derivative products allows investors to design and implement more effective risk
and portfolio management. These products bode well for the development of the
Jordanian financial market as they allow market participants to undertake three
principal activities: to speculate, to arbitrage, or to hedge against adverse
conditions in the cash market.
30. Id. art. 2.
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body of related institutions, entrusted with the responsibility of
promoting and developing the market.
1. JordanSecurities Commission

The first key institution operating in the securities market is the
JSC, the primary regulatory body. The JSC has the capacity to take
all the actions necessary to carry out its prescribed responsibilities
and it reports directly to the Prime Minister." The Securities Law
provides a straightforward statement of the financial and
administrative

independence of the JSC. 32 This statement was

intended to prevent undue influence in the JSC affairs and to help the
JSC accomplish its mission.
As a feature of professionalism, the Securities Law prohibits JSC
from engaging in any commercial activity, having a special interest
in any project intended for profit, "lending any funds, and owning or
issuing any securities."33 The sole job of the JSC is market
regulation.34 Thus, regulators must separate themselves from what
they regulate. The Securities Law of 2002 contains several
provisions that serve to minimize conflicts of interest. Article 11
requires all members of the JSC to make a full disclosure of the
securities they own or control and the securities their relativesdefined in Article 2 as spouses and minor children-own or control,
as well as all changes in their portfolios going forward. Article 11
also prohibits JSC members from engaging in any other profession or
job in any company, in the government, or in public or private
institutions. It further prohibits JSC members from providing advice
to these entities. However, this prohibition applies only to JSC
members and does not extend to JSC employees. Article 24 ensures
that all unpublished information obtained by the JSC or its
employees is treated as confidential, only to be disclosed by the JSC
if necessary for the protection of investors.35

31. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 7.
32. See id. art. 7(A).
33. Id. art. 9(A).
34. See id. art. 8 (setting forth the aims of the JSC which include protecting
investors, protecting the capital market, and regulating the market).
35. Id. art. 24.
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The Securities Law of 2002 also describes the structure of the JSC.
The JSC is run by a board consisting of five full-time members, all
natural Jordanians and qualified market professionals.3 6 These
members will be appointed for a five-year term, renewable only once
by a Royal Decree. The board is headed by a single chairman and a
deputy chairman, appointed by the Council of Ministers. There are
several provisions that describe actions and meetings of the board
and outline the duties of the chairman.37 The board is charged with
the oversight of the Jordanian securities market.
The JSC is financially independent, as the government is not the
JSC's only source of revenue. The financial independence of the JSC
avoids any budgetary drawbacks by the government. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in contrast, sets fees
for a variety of activities and retains these funds.38
However, the JSC's retention of fees could leave it susceptible to
pressure to generate revenue through undue enforcement actions if
there is any kind of budgetary shortfall. Therefore, the JSC maintains
a reserve equal to double its expenditures as reported in its annual
budget.3 9 The JSC can use this reserve to cover any shortages in
revenue. Although the JSC is financially independent, the Council of
Ministers still reviews the JSC's finances when the Council receives
the JSC's annual report and budget, which outlines the JSC activities
for the previous year. 40 Additionally, the JSC must deposit all excess
receipts with the treasury.
The Securities Law grants the JSC the powers necessary to
accomplish its mission. Specifically, the Securities Law gives the
JSC a non-exclusive list of twenty powers that provide for

36. Id. art. 10.
37. Seeid. arts. 13-14.
38. Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77ee (2008). The financial
resources of the SEC include the fees for registration, listing, trading, and
licensing, charges against using its facilities, fines, any funds provided by the
government, and any other sources determined by the SEC. Id.
39. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 29. Article 29 further notes that the
reserve will be built using fees, charges, and fines imposed by the JSC. Id. art.
29(A).
40. Id. art. 26 (requiring that the JSC present an annual report to the Council of
Ministers within the first three months of the new fiscal year that is certified by an
auditor).

774
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administrative needs of the market. 41 For example, the JSC has the
power to set policies and plans. In addition, the Securities Law grants
the JSC full rulemaking authority, including the power to issue rules,
directives, and instructions related to the Securities Law. 42 This
language intends to give the JSC the necessary flexibility to develop
and adapt rules as the Jordanian capital market evolves. The JSC is
further charged to conduct investigations or inspections in order to
perfect its oversight of the market and determine if a person has
violated or is about to violate the Securities Law or any of its rules
and regulations. 43 This language is similar to the language found in
U.S. securities law.44 To carry out its investigatory function, the JSC
has the power to issue subpoenas, take evidence, and inspect any
record as needed.
According to the text of the Securities Law, the JSC makes most,
if not all, the vital decisions concerning the operation of the
Jordanian securities market. By drafting flexible language and
choosing a system that can adapt through new rules, rather than new
legislation, the JSC should be able to meet unforeseen demands and
quickly adjust to a growing and developing Jordanian economy.
However, such flexibility places a burden on the JSC to draft,
implement, and update a comprehensive set of rules. Moreover, the
JSC needs to carefully consider how it should best exercise its
authority given that there are few checks on the JSC's powers.
2. Amman Stock Exchange
The second key institution central to the Securities Law of 2002 is
the Amman Stock Exchange ("ASE"), which took over the functions
of the AFM. The Securities Law established the ASE as the single
entity authorized to carry on trading in securities. 45 The existence of

41. Id. art. 12 (enumerating the broad range of activities over which the JSC
has authority).
42. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 12(Q).
43. Id. art. 17(A)-(B).
44. See Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (2008) [hereinafter
Securities Act] (granting the Commission the authority to subpoena witnesses, take
evidence, and require production of any material deemed relevant to an inquiry

necessary for enforcement of Securities Act).
45. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 65(A) (establishing the Amman
Stock Exchange and providing it with "financial and administrative autonomy").
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a single exchange achieves economy of scale, leads to most efficient
pricing and liquidity, and simplifies the task of regulatory oversight.
An over-the-counter market ("OTC") is not available. The Securities
Law correctly chose not to overburden the Jordanian securities
46
business with an OTC.
The ASE is not a governmental organization, but rather a private,
non-profit organization
with administrative
and financial
independence.47 As a private organization composed of members
who are brokers or dealers, the ASE can craft rules for listed
companies in areas where lawmakers lack the proper jurisdiction,
provided that the rules comply with the applicable securities laws.
Making the ASE a non-profit entity could restrict the incentive to
become a member of the Exchange. However, the structure of the
Jordanian market, with only one stock exchange, makes it impossible
for a broker-dealer to conduct business without being a member of
the ASE. The problem may arise with the development of an OTC
market where broker-dealers are able to transact business outside the
stock exchange and therefore do not need its membership. However,
the development of the OTC market in Jordan is not likely to happen
at this stage.
Although the ASE can hardly be compared to the New York or
London stock exchanges, it follows some of their traits. The ASE
enjoys an independent, self-regulatory nature, which is attractive for

46. The term "over-the-counter market" describes stocks not traded on an
exchange. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange:
Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
1069, 1076 n.35 (2005). It is much easier to control an auction market (such as a
stock exchange), which is physically concentrated in one place, than to regulate an
OTC market, with its amorphous structure and lack of centralized trading. Even
though the OTC market can be made more organized through the introduction of
the automated trading system (like NASDAQ-a computer screen-based market
with no central exchange or trading floor which functions by collecting figures for
both purchase and sale prices entered by brokers around the United States), only
few countries-such as the United States and the United Kingdom-have such a
system, and it would be too ambitious to project the same for Jordan. See id. at
1085.
47. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 65(A) (noting that, given the
ASE's independence, it may acquire property, enter into contracts, and be liable
for legal violations); see also id. art. 65(F) (permitting the JSC to pursue profitmaking activities so long as they do not adversely affect trading).
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several reasons.48 With the stock exchange as independent as
possible from the central government, it helps ease the burden and
workload on the regulators while making the market more responsive
to the needs of issuers, brokers, and investors. Unlike a legislator, a
quasi-self-regulatory ASE can adopt innovative approaches to
problems and modify solutions quickly by its own rule-making
process. Although the ASE designs and administers its own rules, it
has a quasi-self-regulatory structure because it is subject to the JSC's
oversight. JSC can monitor and supervise the work of ASE.49 This
framework diminishes some of the potentially negative aspects of a
"pure" self-regulatory regime, which include bias and inadequate
50
enforcement of rules.
ASE is governed by the ASE Board of Directors comprised of
seven members-two representing banks licensed as brokers and
brokers that are owned by or associated with banks, two representing
brokers not associated with banks, and three representing the private
sector.51 Notably, the ASE Board of Directors does not have
representatives from government agencies.
The ASE regulations provide for direct election of directors.52 The
rules of the ASE govern all remaining details concerning the
structure, operation, and procedures of the board. The board can also
propose bylaws, which govern most policy issues concerning
operation of the ASE. Moreover, it may issue any other rule or
directive deemed necessary to protect investors through ensuring
fairness, efficiency, and transparency in the Exchange's affairs.

48. See Jarad D. Hunter, Comment, "No Crying in Baseball"_ And No More
Crying on the Stock Markets: An Alternate-HybridApproach to Self-Regulation,
74 U. CN. L. REV. 639, 642-45 (2005) (discussing the progression of SEC selfregulation from the Great Crash through collusion on NASDAQ concerning an
implicit agreement by brokers to omit odd-eight quotes in order to ensure larger
spreads, while including the advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation).
49. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 65(G).
50. See Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An
InstitutionalPerspective, 19 LAW & POL'Y 363, 366, 370 (1997) (noting that pure
or voluntary self-regulation is characterized by no direct governmental oversight).
51. See By-Law of the Amman Stock Exchange of 2004, art. 17(b) (Apr. 1,
2004).
52. Id. art. 19.
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3. The Securities Depository Center
While the trading activity takes place in the Exchange, the
Securities Depository Center ("SDC") has control over everything
that happens after the buy and sell orders are matched.53 The SDC is
an independent public entity with the mission of creating and
maintaining property rights.54 The presence of an independent
registry does not allow the management of Jordanian companies to
over-issue securities by simply running printing presses. However,
although providing deference because of the SDC's status as an
independent entity, the JSC retains the power to approve, veto, or
amend any rule of the SDC.55 The power given to the JSC is an
important check, especially because the SDC has the authority to set
5
its own charges.

6

The SDC acts like a databank of securities. After buy and sell
orders are matched, the SDC will clear the transaction by confirming
its details, such as price and quantity. The SDC computer system will
settle the transaction by transferring consideration from the buyer's
account to the seller's account and by transferring title in the
securities to the buyer. After the transaction settles, the SDC will
register the new ownership by amending the list of equity holders for
the company in question. The SDC enjoys a monopoly on all deposit,
transfer, clearance, settlement, and registration business.57 Therefore,
the SDC records are the only evidence of securities ownership in
Jordan.
The SDC must register all transactions effectuated, reported to,
and received by the SDC. To provide guarantees to investors, the
SDC could issue ishaars of ownership (advices) upon the request of

53. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 77 (granting the SDC the
responsibility to conduct clearance, settlement, and registration). The ASE calls for
final settlement by T + 2: date of trade plus two days. It remains unclear what
percentage of securities transactions in Jordan fail to settle.
54. Id. art. 76 (giving the SDC the power to "acquire and dispose of .
property, and to perform all legal acts to realize its objectives").
55. Id. art. 83(A) (requiring the SDC to submit its by-laws and instructions to
the JSC for approval before they are implemented).
56. Id. art. 84 (delegating to the SDC the power to establish commissions, fees,
and fines regulated by their by-laws).
57. Id. art. 77(B).
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an investor.5 8 However, the use of ishaars could raise a problem: The
Jordanian securities market has a tradition of using certificates of
registration as a proxy for the property rights of investors. Brokers
could continue to use secondary trading of certificates of registration
unless the SDC's ishaars come to replace them in the eyes of
investors. In addition, ishaars and certificates of registration may
create an opportunity for traders to defraud unsophisticated investors
who are not aware of the fact that certificates of registration have no
value and do not represent any recognized rights. The JSC and SDC
will have to address the role that ishaars and certificates of
registration will play in the future of the Jordanian securities market,
and ascertain how they can be integrated into the computerized
system at the Exchange.
The SDC is considered the most efficient way to operate a
securities market. The system of the SDC is cheaper and more
efficient than the traditional methods of clearance, settlement, and
registration.5 9 By choosing this system, Jordan availed itself of the
conveniences and efficiency of modem information technology.6 0
However, the system does have drawbacks. For example, the SDC
system is more vulnerable to security risks than a paper-based
system. Therefore, the SDC needs to invest in strong computer
security measures to ensure public confidence in the system.
Moreover, using the computerized SDC system could raise concerns
for some investors in Jordan who are used to dealing in paper
representations of their ownership rights. There should be a high

58. See The Instructions of Registration, Deposit, and Settlement of Securities
for the Year 2004, art. 4(C) (Jordan), available at http://209.61.192.188/english
/instruction-1 1.shtm (requiring the SDC to provide services to investors, including
the "issuance of an ownership notice for deposited securities").
59. See generally Mark Gillen & Pittman Potter, Convergence of Securities
Laws and Implications for Developing Securities Markets, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 83, 86 (1998) (discussing the effect of the convergence of securities
laws around the world on the strategies used in formulating laws by developing
securities markets, like that in Jordan). The settlement, clearance, and registration
system designed in Jordan was a departure from the time-honored ways of most
developed securities markets.
60. See Thaer Qadoumi, The Effect of Conversion to Electronic Dealing System
on the OperatingEfficiency and Performance of Amman Stock Exchange, 11 ALBALQA J. RES. & STUD. 73, 87-92 (2006) (the use of technology in the Amman
Stock Exchange, which is very recent, has lead to reduction in costs, improvement
in transparency, and increase in the volume of trade on the Exchange).
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standard of accountability for the SDC to ensure security of stock
ownership.

C.

DISCLOSURE

Used as a shield against fraud, deception, and manipulation, and as
a building block of an efficient market, the practice of public
disclosure has taken root in many countries. 6 1 Like most securitiesrelated laws in other countries, the Securities Law of 2002 makes
public disclosure one of its fundamental tenets. The Jordanian
Securities Law follows the philosophy that the government does not
guarantee the quality of investments, but rather assures that all the
information is disclosed to the investing public. 62 Absent disclosure
of information regarding the issuers of securities, average retail
investors have no mechanism for distinguishing between high and
low quality enterprises, which could hamper efficient allocation of
capital.
An issuer must make an initial public disclosure prior to the sale of
a security and must make continuing disclosures for as long as the
shares are listed. The Securities Law requires issuers of securities to
notify the JSC. Furthermore, a prospectus must be filed with the JSC,
approved by the JSC, and published to the public prior to an offer to
sell any security. 63 However, in certain cases, the issuer is exempt
from filing a prospectus. Exemptions are left to the rulemaking
power of the JSC and may be based on the limited number of
purchasers or the amount of an offering. 6' For example, the JSC may

61. See Samuel Wolff, Implementation of InternationalDisclosure Standards,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 91, 96-104 (2001) (reviewing disclosure standards in
several states, including Australia, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, the United States,
and the United Kingdom); see also Merritt B. Fox, Optimal Regulatory Areas for
Securities Disclosure, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1022-23 (2003) (discussing the
public benefits derived from disclosure for issuers).
62. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 359-61 (1991) (noting the use of an approach in Kansas that
requires the disclosure of certain information to a private or public administrative
body that will assess the merits of investment in the securities and will only allow
the distribution if investment in the securities met some minimum quality
standard). This was known as the "blue sky" legislation. Id. This legislation was
later adopted in several states and in foreign jurisdictions. Id.
63. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, arts. 34(A), 41(A).
64. Id. art. 36.
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grant an exemption from submitting a prospectus if the number of
investors is limited and those investors are capable of assessing and
bearing the investment risks. These offering exemptions may come
in handy in Jordan, where many potential issuers could be unable to
afford the costs of filing a prospectus. As such, the introduction of
exemptions to filing a prospectus will help expand the Jordanian
securities market.
Compared with the U.S. securities laws,65 the Jordanian Securities
Law of 2002 makes no distinction between a prospectus and a
registration statement. The absence of such a distinction is
appropriate given the size of the Jordanian capital market and it also
simplifies the registration process by eliminating many of the
complexities of the pre-registration period. The content of the
prospectus is set forth in the rules decreed by the JSC rather than in a
schedule or annex attached to the law.66 Thus, the Securities Law of
2002 lays down the general categories of necessary informationissuer data, securities data, audited financial data-but leaves it to
the JSC to decide how much and what nature of each is sufficient.
For example, the JSC could require a prospectus to contain
information regarding the issuer's financial history and its use of
profits.
The JSC must approve all prospectuses before they become valid,
but the Securities Law restricts the JSC powers by allowing them to
reject a prospectus for only three reasons.67 Moreover, the JSC has
65. See Michael G. Byers, Comment, Eschew Obfuscation-The Merits of the
SEC's PlainEnglish Doctrine, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 135, 165-68 (2000) (noting that
a public offering under U.S. securities laws requires the filing of a registration
statement, which includes the prospectus). A prospectus is Part I of the registration
statement and is the portion of the registration statement that is delivered to the
investor, to the offeree, or purchaser. The registration statement is not delivered to
the investor, but is filed with the SEC. The registration statement has to be
reviewed, cleared, and declared effective by the SEC before sales can be

confirmed. U.S. law contemplates a two-step registration process comprised of a
waiting period and a post-registration period. The law does not prohibit oral offers
during the waiting period. Also, in recognition of the fact that the prices of
securities change rapidly and cannot be known in advance, U.S. regulations allow
issuers to deliver a so-called preliminary prospectus. This complex scheme of the
U.S. securities laws is not contemplated by the Jordanian Securities Law.

66. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 34(A)(2).
67. The reasons are as follows: (1) if the prospectus does not conform to the
requirements of the Securities Law, regulations, or instructions issued pursuant
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thirty days to either approve or deny the prospectus.6 8 The thirty-day
limit protects the issuer against bureaucratic inefficiency. The JSC
also decides how long each individual prospectus will remain valid.69
The JSC must be informed, in writing or electronically, of any
change in the information contained in the prospectus that "may
affect the value of the security. ' 7° Thus, the Securities Law contains
an objective standard that requires notification of any material event
that "may" have an impact.
The Securities Law of 2002 allows an issuer to sell only after the
prospectus has been approved by the JSC and it forbids the sale of a
security without the buyer first receiving the prospectus. 7' Thus, the
Securities Law requires not' only that the prospectus be "sent" to the
buyer, but also requires that it actually be "received" by the buyer as
well. More specifically, the Securities Law requires the issuer to send
the prospectus to the buyer prior to the sale date, rather than allowing
it to accompany the delivery of the security. In the future, the JSC
could permit delivery of the prospectus to accompany confirmation
72
of the transaction.
After the prospectus has been approved and published, and all the
required fees have been paid, offers may be made through a
prospectus, an advertisement, or other written materials.7 3 The
Securities Law does not require the issuer to clear the writing or
thereto; (2) the prospectus or any accompanying information contains false,
inaccurate, or misleading data, it omits materials facts that enable the investor to
make an investment decision, or it presents information in a way that renders the
information set forth false, misleading, or inaccurate; (3) if the required fees for the
effectiveness of the prospectus are not paid. Id. art. 41 (B).
68. Id. art. 39.
69. Id.

70. Id. art. 40.
71. Id. art. 34(C) (stating that this is the requirement for public offerings only).
72. Compare Directives on Issuance and Registration of Securities, Annex 2,
Requirements for the Registration of Securities Shares Prospectus, Existing
Companies, available at http://www.ase.com.jo/ (describing the purpose of a
prospectus at this time as informing the investor about a company's finances), with
69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal§ 288 (2008) (discussing the
situation in the United States and the notion that prospectuses may be issued
generally to the public and do not have to be delivered to each individual investor).
73. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 34(B) (noting that the JSC will issue
instructions detailing the content and use of advertisements, but the Securities Law
requires that, at a minimum, such advertisements must contain a summary of the
prospectus).
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other advertising materials with any regulator prior to its use. As
stated, it requires prior approval of the prospectus, as well as delivery
to the buyer before the actual sales date. This system could provide
sufficient protection against fraud and deception with minimal
burden on the issuer.
Issuers of securities should not view a piospectus in Jordan only as
a selling document; it can also serve as insurance. It is important for
a prospectus to fully disclose all material facts to avoid being
challenged subsequently by investors on the grounds that it failed to
fully disclose the company, its prospects, and its business. Therefore,
in some respects, it could be more important to view the prospectus
as an insurance document than as a selling document. At the very
least, a comfortable balance has to be struck so that issuers do not
have liabilities under the Securities Law after the sale.
Along with the requirement of initial public disclosure, the
Securities Law of 2002 gives great attention to the requirements of
periodic disclosure. The need for periodic disclosure is arguably even
greater than the need for initial disclosure, as companies only go
public once but continue to be traded afterwards. The rationale
behind the periodic disclosure system is to increase the quality,
quantity, and timeliness of information flowing from issuers to
investors.
The Securities Law requires annual and semi-annual reports
containing financial statements.74 Financial statements could include
balance sheets, income statements, statements of equity, and cash
flow statements. Annual reports, which contain the financial
statements, must be filed no later than ninety calendar days after the
end of the fiscal year and should be audited as required by the law. 5
The auditing requirement applies only to annual reports. Issuers are
also required to file and publish a report describing the board of
6
directors and any change in its composition.
In addition to annual and semi-annual reports, issuers must keep
the JSC abreast of any material events that occur between the
74. Id. art. 43(A) (providing that the annual report must be submitted ninety
days after the end of a company's fiscal year, and the semi-annual report must be
submitted thirty days after the midpoint of its fiscal year).
75. Id. art. 43(A)(1).
76. Id. art. 43(A)(4).
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reporting periods.77 Material events include, for instance, events that
may affect the price of stock. Furthermore, the ASE has the power to
compel disclosure of any issuer-specific data and to publish this
information. 7 The exercise of this power requires no preliminary
publication of the reasons or grounds, nor is it subject to any prior
application for an order from the courts. The disclosure rules allow
the public to review and make copies of any prospectus, report, or
data that have been publicized and filed with the JSC.79 Public access
to reports and data should maximize investor confidence in the
capital market.
The JSC defines the exact form and amount of information
required in the periodic reports.80 For example, the JSC could require
submission of a management statement forecast of current and future
developments expected to have significant effect on the company's
financial position. Since the Securities Law does not contain an
annex outlining the forms and instructions for disclosure
submissions, the JSC has the power to develop these forms and
instructions by directives." The directives will, therefore, specify all
the important details required in each submission, including required
supplementary documents, methods of public disclosure, and
information regarding which company officers should sign each
submission to certify its authenticity and accuracy.
77. Id. art. 43(D). The disclosure requirements under the Jordanian Securities
Law resemble those requirements under U.S. securities laws. However, the
reporting obligation relating to material events does not exist in U.S. law. See
Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform:
The Impact of Regulation FD and CurrentDisclosureInitiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus.
& FIN. 225, 231 (2002) (explaining that while good business practices that have
developed over seventy years require disclosure of material changes, neither the
Securities Act of 1933 nor the SEC prescribe a specific duty to file changes in

material facts).
78. Amman Stock Exchange Disclosure Directives for the Year 2004, art. 3(B)
(Jordan), available at http://www.ase.com.jo/pages.php?menu-id=29&local-type
=0&local id=O&localdetails=0 [hereinafter Disclosure Directives] (requiring the
ASE to disclose daily, weekly, and yearly trading information, including

immediate disclosure of information that would affect the price of the security).
79. Id. art. 3(C).
80. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 43(B).
81. Cf Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation

and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 488 n.59 (2007) (explaining
that, consistent with requirements of U.S. law, the SEC utilizes disclosure forms
such as the Form 20-F).
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The Jordan Securities Law's approach seems logical because it
grants the JSC the authority to determine the content and form for
disclosure submission via directives. This approach is better than one
that fills the Securities Law with pages of complex instructions and
forms. An added benefit of this approach is that directives are much
easier to change than laws. In other words, the disclosure forms and
instructions are far more flexible and adaptive as directives than as
parts of the law. The directives will continue to require new
information as the Jordanian capital market demands.
Disclosures to investors, however, are now required only annually
or semi-annually, and even then they are issued long after the year
has ended.8" Thus, the information investors receive can be stale on
arrival. Moreover, the overall voluntary disclosure is poor. 3 The
Internet makes it easier for issuers to disseminate timely information
for the sake of shareholders and investors. The JSC has recognized
the importance of the Internet as a communication tool for the
investment community. Therefore, the Jordanian Securities Law
gave issuers guidance concerning the electronic delivery of
prospectuses, annual reports and semi-annual reports, and other
materials.8 4 For example, issuers can provide periodic reports to the
investing public via corporate Web sites.
As a practical matter, an electronic disclosure regime may not be
readily implemented in Jordan, given the status of issuers'
information technology infrastructures. It could be argued that
additional costs imposed on issuers as a result of a move to an
electronic disclosure system could hinder the adoption of such a
system. Furthermore, the same features of the Internet that have
82. See Disclosureof Information by Listed Companies, AL RAI, May 25, 2007

(stating that forty-two companies did not submit preliminary reports of their
activities for the year 2006 within the specified deadline). In addition, twenty-six
companies did not provide the JSC with annual reports for the year 2006 within the
specified term.
83. See Ayman E. Haddad, Voluntary Disclosure and Stock Market Liquidity:
Evidence from the Jordanian Capital Market 10-12 (2007) (unpublished

manuscript) (on file with author) (stating that voluntary disclosure is defined as
those items of information which are not stipulated by the Jordanian statutory

regulations). These items include background information, future and projected
information, employee information, and acquisition and disposal information.
84. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, arts. 35(B), 37(A), 40, 43(B), 43(C)
(providing information about how companies should organize securities-related

documents and what content may be presented in such documents).
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made it an expedient vehicle for gathering and disseminating
information-broad coverage, speed, and low costs-could make it
an easy vehicle for the perpetration of securities fraud.
On a final note, one mechanism that can be relied upon for
compelling disclosure is the ASE. It can impose disclosure
requirements on issuers through its ability to condition the right to
trade on compliance with certain requirements commonly referred to
as listing standards." Listing standards typically are split into two
categories: quantitative standards and qualitative standards.
Quantitative standards pertain to the trading environment and market
process sought by the ASE.86 Qualitative standards address matters
that do not pertain directly to liquidity or to the underlying market
mechanism of an exchange, but to the conduct of the listed
companies. For example, qualitative standards typically require
Jordanian companies who trade securities on the ASE to agree to
make public disclosure of financial data and business information.8 7
All companies must adhere to minimum disclosure requirements or
they lose the privilege of the floor. Thus, trading on the ASE is
regarded as a privilege, not a right. Subjecting issuers to these
minimum disclosure requirements serves also as a signal of

85. See Disclosure Directives, supra note 79, art. 3(A) (providing these
standards). Listing standards are the requirements of the ASE and are applicable to
the securities traded on the exchange and to the issuer of such securities. The
primary purpose of these standards is generally understood to be the facilitation of
the efficient functioning of the exchange by ensuring that there is some baseline
method of comparison among companies.
86. See id. Typical quantitative requirements include that a company maintain
a minimum net income and aggregate market value of shares (also required by
most Western exchanges), that the stock be widely held prior to listing, that some
minimum percentage of the shares outstanding be owned by outside (that is, nonmanagement) shareholders, and that it maintain a certain monthly trading volume.
87. See Listing Securities Directive, supra note 28, art. 5(B) (specifying the
requirements of this report). To be considered for listing on the market, an issuer
must submit a written application accompanied by documents calling for
significant disclosure. In addition, the ASE may request additional information
from an issuer if needed to enable it to decide whether to admit any security for
trading. There is no express limitation on what type of information may be sought.
Id. In the future, Jordan could open an additional trading floor for companies that
do not qualify for listing on the main exchange. The new exchange would make
more shares accessible to the public, but will involve higher risks due to easier
listing requirements. To date there has been no action on this type of trading floor.
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investment quality and therefore can add to the protection of
investors.
D. SECURITIES MARKET PROFESSIONALS

Articles 47 and 64 of the Securities Law establish the rules
governing the activities and oversight of market professionals. The
starting point for understanding the JSC's jurisdiction over market
professionals is defining these professionals. The Securities Law lists
the following as market professionals: brokers, dealers, investment
trustees, investment managers, financial advisors, financial services
companies, and custodians.88 The basic test for deciding whether a
company or an individual is a market professional is whether they
are undertaking one of the activities of the listed professionals. These
activities include acting as an intermediary in a securities trade,
offering securities accounts to others, or placing securities for an
issuer.
The Securities Law uses an operational definition of market
professionals. In other words, one becomes a broker in Jordan by
seeking broker status, not acting as a broker. Furthermore, the law
distinguishes between the different types of market professionals.
For example, the law distinguishes between brokers and dealers.89
The definitions provided for market professionals impose a balancing
act upon them. If a financial advisor undertakes the activities of a
broker, he automatically becomes an unlicensed broker and could
face sanctions. The activities of a broker or dealer must take place in
one's commercial capacity. 9° Therefore, an individual who is acting
for himself, and not seeking financial profit through the act of buying
and selling securities, will not fall within the jurisdictional reach of
the Securities Law.

88. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 47. The text of the Jordanian
Securities Law borrowed the list of market professionals from a provision in the
U.K. law covering those individuals who hold themselves out as being engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities.
89. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 2(A). A financial broker is any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for the account of
others, while a dealer is any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account. Id.
90. Commercial law defines the commercial nature of broker activities.
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Although the Securities Law made a careful distinction between
the different categories of market professionals, the mechanics for
licensing and ultimate outcome are the same. All market
professionals need licenses from the JSC in order to carry out
business. The law forbids any individual or company from
undertaking brokerage activities without first acquiring a license,
unless it is exempted by the JSC's instructions. 9' The JSC will
determine the basic requirements and competencies of market
professionals. 92 The burden to apply to the JSC for a license is on any
company or individual that wishes to undertake securities activities. 93
The JSC reviews each application fully and must issue a license
within sixty days if the application is in order and the applicant meets
all of the requisite standards. The licensing requirement is a
continuing necessity, mandating periodic recertification of a market
professional's license.94 While not written into the Securities Law,
the process of recertification should include, at the minimum, a
review of the market professional's business practices, character, and
financial standing, and could include a re-testing of basic skills and
knowledge.
Given the central role market professionals like brokers and
dealers play in a capital market, it is not surprising that the Securities
Law sets out the duties of these professionals. Market professionals
owe duties to their clients. Specifically, market professionals should
act with "loyalty and dedication to maximize their clients'
interests."95 Also, market professionals must refrain from charging
clients excessive service fees or commissions, and engaging in
deceptive practices. Duties of market professionals also include the
duty to maintain accounting records and the duty to separate their
money and securities from the money and securities of their client. 96
Any violation of these duties may result in sanctions by the JSC. 97
91. See id. art. 47(B)-(D).
92. See id. art. 47(C). The instructions of the JSC will determine the level of
training, experience, competence, testing, and capital requirements. Id.
93. See id. art. 48.

94. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 49, 59(A), 59(B) (stating that
licenses expire on December 31 st of each year).
95. Id. art. 57.
96. Id. art. 54(C), 55(A).
97. Id. art. 60(A) (noting that the board may "deny, suspend or revoke the
license of any person found to have violated any provision of the law").
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For example, the JSC could suspend or revoke the license or
registration of a market professional who violates the Securities Law
or the JSC rules and instructions.
The Securities Law does not create a long, exhaustive list of
duties. Such a list would have hampered the growth of
professionalism. Moreover, including all the duties in the law would
be impractical since they would be difficult to change at a later date.
The current system of regulation allows greater input from market
professionals and thereby takes advantage of their perspectives and
experiences in dealing with the law and the JSC.
Market professionals must file reports as required in the
instructions and rules of the JSC. These periodic reports form the
regulators' general oversight of market professionals. Furthermore,
the JSC has the power to carry out investigations and inspections of
any licensed market professional in order to determine if a violation
has occurred or is about to occur. 98 This power includes the authority
to compel the attendance of witnesses and to take evidence. The JSC
must also supervise the compulsory or voluntary liquidation of any
market professional's business.99 This supervision should allow the
JSC to protect investors' interests in these cases.
Finally, the JSC has the power to grant an order suspending the
license of any broker who has passed away or has not engaged in
business as a broker.1l0 This provision is designed as a housekeeping
measure whereby the JSC strikes all those who have died or ceased
to be brokers from its list.
E. MUTUAL FUNDS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES
The second common type of market professionals that may
promote trading are mutual funds and investment companies.
Although individuals in Jordan own stock directly, they can also own
98. See id. art. 17(A), 68 (providing the JSC with broad power to investigate
any violations of the law); see also id. art. 56 (detailing the types of conduct that
would make a licensed market professional in violation of this law).
99. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 62(A).
100. Id. art. 61. The language of this provision is similar to that found in the
U.S. securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(5)
(2007) (stating that "if the Commission finds that any registered broker or dealer is
no longer in existence or has ceased to do business as a broker or a dealer, the
Commission ... shall cancel the registration of such broker or dealer").

2008]

REFLECTIONS ON THE SECURITIESLAW OFJORDAN

789

stock indirectly, through mutual funds and the like. Such institutional
arrangements isolate the individual investor from the trading
decision. Trading occurs only at the institutional manager's behest.
Mutual funds and other investment companies are financial
intermediaries that pool money from investors and entrust such
money to professional managers to make investments on behalf of
the investors. Mutual funds and investment companies offer two
primary benefits.' 01 First, by pooling the financial resources of
dispersed investors, they allow investors to gain access to the
expertise of professional managers. 02 Second, investors gain access
to the advantages of wide diversification of ownership in the
securities market. According to modem finance theory, an efficient
portfolio is one that secures the maximum return for a given level of
risk. ' 3 Thus, diversification is essential to eliminating what appears
to be a risk in taking in specific securities.
The Securities Law includes detailed provisions for the regulation
of mutual funds. The law defines mutual funds as "funds established
to invest in a portfolio of securities or other financial assets for the
purpose of providing professional management of collective
investment on behalf of holders."'0 4 Thus, the Securities Law
recognizes a new class of market professionals-portfolio or
investment managers. Although the activities of portfolio managers
would technically fall within the definition of "broker," the
101. Mutual funds and investment companies provide other benefits. In
jurisdictions that impose no officially fixed commission rates, mutual funds
provide the benefit of lower transaction costs resulting from volume discounts on
brokerage commissions. Moreover, to keep attuned to investor needs, mutual fund
industries in some countries have adapted and expanded their services to suit
investors' needs. For instance, many mutual funds offer automatic reinvestment
programs, automatic withdrawal, exchange privileges, and other services.
102. In selecting the securities in which to invest, managers perform extensive
economic and financial research. The aim of this research is to develop data so that
intelligent decisions can be made about securities in the portfolio. Portfolio
managers use sophisticated portfolio management theories (for example, riskreward, stock-picking, efficient market hypothesis and indexation) to conduct
securities analysis.
103. See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady:
A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations
of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 189, 243-48 (1998) (explaining through
statistical analysis that efficiency in a portfolio is found when the compensation for
a security matches its risk premium).
104. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 2.
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Securities Law carves out a specific definition and role for them."°5
Instead of encumbering either group of market professionals with
rules written with the other group in mind, the Securities Law treats
each group individually, creating more leeway for specialized
treatment of portfolio managers.
The JSC regulates mutual funds and investment companies.
Subjects of regulation include registration requirements for mutual
funds and investment companies.10 6 Registration requirements are
arguably the most important part of any legislation addressing
investment companies. In that respect, the regulatory scheme of the
Jordanian Securities Law follows the ideology of the U.S. law, which
requires all investment companies to register."°7 A few points in the
Jordanian Securities Law demand special attention with regard to
registration requirements. First, the Securities Law subjects mutual
funds and other investment companies to licensing requirements
different from those imposed upon broker-dealers and other market
participants.108 Thus, the approach followed by the Securities Law
does not create uniformity in licenses for all market participants and
makes it difficult for the JSC, which has yet to acquire expertise, to
control the process of licensing. Second, the Securities Law specifies
exemptions for certain investment companies from its licensing
process. 109
The Securities Law also provides that the shares and investment
units of an investment company or mutual fund are subject to the

105. See id. art. 2 (distinguishing between a financial broker and an investment
or portfolio manager). A portfolio manager is defined as any person who, on the
basis of a contractual arrangement, engages in the business of managing securities
portfolios for the account of others, including the management of mutual funds. Id.
106. Id. art. 92.
107. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1994)
(requiring investment companies to register with the SEC and setting forth the
manner in which investment companies must register); see also id. § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-7 (prohibiting unregistered investment companies from engaging in

interstate transactions).
108. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, arts. 104-105 (placing special
requirements on investment managers of mutual fund-such as promoting and
marketing the mutual fund's shares and monitoring the fund's management-in
addition to those imposed on all "Licensed Persons" discussed earlier in this
Article).

109. Id. art. 94.
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registration requirements of the law." 0 This provision makes clear
that other registration requirements, as they pertain to the investment
companies and its management, do not relieve the company from an
obligation to register its securities under the Securities Law.
The final licensing requirement pertains to managers of mutual
funds and investment companies."' These persons must be licensed
by the JSC. The language of the Jordanian Securities Law most
closely parallels section 203 of the U.S. Investment Advisers Act,
which requires investment advisers to register." 2 The purpose of
licensing investment managers is to prevent persons with certain
criminal records from acting as investment advisers. To that end, for
example, investment companies may refuse employment to a
manager of a mutual fund or an investment company if the person
applying for such a position has been found guilty of forgery or
counterfeiting.
The Securities Law left the investment companies relatively free
to organize in any form they wish. For example, investment
companies can be in the form of open joint-stock companies,
partnerships, or limited liability companies. A mutual fund and an
investment company must include the words "mutual fund" or
"investment company" in its name; no other company may use such
designation." 3 This requirement echoes the provisions of general
corporation laws that attempt to prevent companies from deceiving
the general population by using misleading names.
Like ordinary corporations, the mutual fund establishes a
hierarchical and centralized management body. The Securities Law
requires that "shareholders" elect a board of directors. 1 4 It is
important to note at the outset that the description of investors as
"shareholders" in the mutual fund suggests that they are entitled to
the same set of shareholder rights as corporate shareholders. Their
110. Id. art. 105.
111. See id. art. 103 (providing that a mutual fund's investments are to be

managed by a licensed investment manager).
112. See Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (prohibiting
investment advisors from using "any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce" in connection with their business unless they are registered).
113. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 2 (giving the definitions of
"Mutual Fund" and "Investment Company" under Jordanian law).
114. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 95.
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participation rights are based on a preconception of the rights
associated with "shareholder" or "owner." The Securities Law also
requires that no more than twenty percent of the board of directors be
affiliated with the manager." 5 This requirement is predicated on the
belief that the mutual fund governance system works best when the
functions required of independent directors are performed by
individuals who are truly independent. The board of directors is
principally responsible for reviewing and evaluating the management
and distribution arrangements of the manager.
Although mutual funds are nominally independent and supervised
by their own boards of directors, they are managed by an investment
manager pursuant to a contractual arrangement that is subject to
general review by its board of directors.11 6 The directors must
annually approve the advisory agreement between the mutual fund
and the manager. An investment manager's control over the fund
typically includes organizing and promoting the fund, managing the
fund's portfolio, and supervising the business operations of the
fund. 17 The extensive control over the fund wielded by the manager
is a matter of necessity because the fund's directors usually do not
possess the expertise needed to manage the fund. Thus, the directors'
dependence on the adviser is problematic.
In addition to the manager, a mutual fund usually contracts with a
custodian, a transfer agent, a principal underwriter, and other thirdparty service providers to distribute fund shares. Under the Securities
Law, principal underwriting contracts are subject to similar board
scrutiny." 8 Shareholders must evaluate and approve such contracts
and any renewals.
The Securities Law envisions two types of investment companies
and mutual funds: open and closed. 119 An open type of authorized
fund of an investment company is a fund that issues securities with
115. Id. (signifying that affiliation is one of the criteria for whether a director is
independent).
116. Id. arts. 95(A), 103(A)-(B) (stating also that the contractual agreement must
be published and provided to all shareholders before coming into effect).
117. Id. art. 104.
118. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 96(A) (describing the elements of
closed-end and open-end, and noting that a closed-end fund may transform into an
open-end fund if certain criteria are met).
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an obligation to redeem them (that is, buy them back); and a closed
type fund is one that does not have such an obligation. 20 The
classification of investment companies under the Jordanian
Securities Law is the same as the one used for investment companies
in the United States under section 5 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940.121
One distinctive feature of mutual funds is the redeemable nature of
the claims that investors hold. Investors have the right to redeem
their shares at their current average net asset value. 122 A redeemable
security entitles the holder at his option to receive his pro rata share
of the pool's current net assets. Thus, mutual fund investors hold
fluctuating claims, not a fixed claim like debt holders. The right to
redeem shares is self-enforcing because its enforcement is not
dependent on judicial intervention or third-party decisions. The
decision of the claim holder to withdraw resources is a form of
partial takeover or liquidation, which deprives management of
control over a portion of the fund's assets. Thus, this control right
can be exercised independently by each claim holder. Admittedly, in
determining whether to exercise redemption rights, investors have to
take into consideration factors such as redemption fees and tax
consequences. To summarize, the availability of redemption rights
within mutual funds would result in high investor mobility and a
competitive environment for mutual funds.
Investors are the judges of the legal and economic arrangements
that they purchase and the Securities Law does not impose any
standard with respect to the securities in which these companies may
invest their assets. Nonetheless, the Securities Law restricts the
freedom of mutual funds and investment companies to invest in
certain transactions.' 23 The Securities Law prohibits mutual fund and
120. Id. art. 97(A); see id. arts. 97-98(A) (stipulating that the shares of an openend fund are generally not transferable, whereas shares of a closed-end fund are
transferable and tradable).
121. See Investment Company Act § 5(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(l) (2004)
(defining open-end companies as those that issue redeemable securities and closedend companies as those that issue non-redeemable securities).
122. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 100(B).
123. Compare id. art. 102(B) (restricting the ability of Jordanian investment
advisers to invest or own certain types or amounts of securities), with Investment
Company Act §§ 8(b), 12(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8(b), 12(a)-(b) (1994)
(demonstrating that, rather than relying on restrictions to regulate investment
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investment companies from conducting any activity other than the
business of investment, or activity related to the business of
investment. The law's prohibition on incurring debt above the limits
prescribed or investing in securities of one issuer above the limits
prescribed assures the financial security of an investment
company. 124 The law also prohibits a mutual fund or investment
company from issuing preferred shares. 125 All these restrictions fight
potential abuses because of the importance of investment funds and
investment companies in the capital market. The Securities Law
attempted to ensure that these funds would not undermine public
trust in the capital market by engaging in fraudulent practices.
As this review of mutual funds and investment companies
provisions in Jordan indicates, the Securities Law is simple and
straightforward. The simplicity of the Securities Law is justified by
the conditions of the Jordanian market. 126 Securities regulation
should be made with an eye toward future developments, but
excessively complex regulation could unduly burden the Jordanian
market. In sum, even though managers of Jordanian mutual funds
and investment companies, unlike their Western counterparts, do not
have to deal with all the complexities of modem investment
strategies, their primary task of composing a financially sound

companies, the U.S. law relies mainly on disclosure). U.S. investment companies
are required to disclose to the investing public their investment policies in advance.
Id. § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b). The Investment Companies Act also states that
investment companies must seek approval of the majority of shareholders before
changing their investment policies. Id. § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b). Finally, the
SEC is empowered to regulate certain transactions that are deemed to be
particularly risky. Id. Nevertheless, like the Jordanian securities statute, the
Investment Company Act does enumerate certain restrictions on investment
company transactions, such as limiting the availability of purchasing securities on

margins and engaging in short selling. Id. § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a).
124. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 102(B).
125. See id. arts. 95(A), 100(A) (noting that Mutual Fund's capital must be
divided into shares with "equal entitlements").
126. Most of the complexities of the U.S. Investment Companies Act of 1940,
the most extensive U.S. securities statute, are inapplicable to the investment
vehicles that exist in Jordan. For example, the Jordanian Securities Law does not
cover issuers that issue face-amount certificates of the installment type. See
generally Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment
Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 939 (2005) (describing the
development of investment company regulation by the SEC).
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investment portfolio is basically the same as that of the managers at
Vanguard or Fidelity.
F. VIOLATIONS AND SANCTIONS
The Securities Law supplies the tools necessary for the JSC to
enforce its rules. The Securities Law authorizes two approaches to
enforcement: public actions and private suits. The law affords the
JSC a range of powers to enforce its rules. These powers run from
suspension of license to criminal sanctions. Additionally, the law
allows for private suits to recover money lost due to the illegal
activities of others.
The Securities Law empowers the JSC to take public action
against anyone who violates the law, JSC rules, or its decisions. In
these cases, the JSC has the power to levy a fine not exceeding
Jordanian Dinar 100,000 (approximately $141,113 USD) against that
person.'2 7 The law also imposes heavy fines, not less than twice the
amount of profit made or loss avoided, against any person
responsible for violating the law or any rule.
The law imposes public sanctions against anyone operating as a
broker without a license. Unlicensed brokers can be imprisoned for
up to one year.'28 Brokers are paid a commission on every stock
transaction they execute, profiting from trades regardless of whether
the trading investor profits. Therefore, they have financial incentives
to encourage trading. One way brokers can persuade investors to
trade is by providing them with imperfect information suggesting
that a particular stock or industry sector is significantly underpriced
and therefore will create perceived opportunities for speculative
profits. Therefore, the law prohibits brokers from using fraud in the
sale of securities.2 9 It is extremely difficult, however, to prove that
slanted advice was fraudulent because of the evidentiary problems
involved in proving both intent and the content of brokers' oftenverbal representations. The investor who falls prey to an
unscrupulous or overoptimistic broker, in the meantime, may have

127. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 110(A).
128. Id. art. I10(B)(2).
129. See id. art. 112(B) (asserting that if the JSC finds that any broker or agent
has committed fraud or deceit, it may revoke or suspend the broker's license).
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suffered substantial losses from bad trades and brokerage
commissions.
In addition to public actions, investors in the Jordanian securities
market have two private causes of action under the Securities Law.
The first cause of action is the right of recovery in the event that an
investor incurs a loss as a result of the sale of securities.'30 The
investor must prove that the sale of securities was carried out in
manner contrary to the Securities Law, its regulations, instructions,
and decisions. Further, privity is required.' 3 ' In other words, the
investor must prove that he incurred the loss as a result of the sale of
securities.
The second private cause of action is to recover damages resulting
from a material misrepresentation in a prospectus.'
The law
provides that a material misrepresentation is an untrue statement of
fact or the omission of a necessary, material fact. Materiality is
proven by showing that the untrue statement or omission affected the
decision of an investor to sell, buy, or continue to hold the
securities.'33 Under this standard, the effect of the statement or
omission on the investor's decision will be determined on a case-bycase basis. The misstatement or omission must exist at the time the
prospectus is approved by the JSC for a cause of action to accrue
under the law. Issuers, therefore, can make any necessary corrections
at any time prior to final approval. However, the law does not state
whether there is still a cause of action or not where events occur that
render the prospectus materially misleading subsequent to its
approval. Therefore, the JSC will need to issue instructions or rules
for publishing a corrected prospectus and designating how long an
issuer has to act before an uncorrected prospectus becomes subject to
suit.

130. Id. art. 111(A).
131. See id. art. 11I(A)(2) (implying that a sale must have occurred for an action
to take place).
132. Compare id. arts. 42(A), 42(B), 107(C), 110(E), 111(B) (setting forth a

private cause of action for misrepresentations in a prospectus mirroring U.S.
provisions for such liability), with Securities Act of 1933 § 11, as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 77k (1998) (providing a cause of action for victims of registration
statements containing "untrue statement[s] of... material fact").
133. Id. art. Ill(B)(l)-(2).
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Just as with U.S. law, the Jordanian Securities Law provides a list
of individuals who may be found liable for misrepresentations. 134
Any one of these individuals may avoid liability upon a showing of
due diligence. The Jordanian Securities Law, however, does not
detail the standard for due diligence. For example, the law does not
state a necessity to show that after "reasonable investigation," and on
the basis of reasonable grounds, an individual was convinced that
that there was no material omission or misstatement. The law does
not specify the standard of reasonableness for due diligence.' 35 In
addition, the Securities Law, on its face, is silent as to the knowledge
of truth by a purchaser at the time of purchase as a defense to
misrepresentation. Thus, arguably, the Securities Law does not bar
an action by a purchaser for false and misleading statements if the
purchaser knew the truth about the securities, despite the misleading
statements.
The basic rule for measuring damages under all these private
causes of action is the amount of loss suffered or profits foregone.
However, the defendants may reduce the measure of the damages by
showing that any loss suffered or profit foregone was not caused by
the violation in question.
The Securities Law provides limitation periods. Litigants must
initiate suits under these two private rights of action within two
"' Parties may not, by an agreement or otherwise,
years. 36
change the
duration of the limitations period. The limitations period begins to
run from the date of the sale of securities or the effective date of the
prospectus.
134. This list of individuals is dispersed in several places in the Securities Law.
See id. arts. 42, 107(C), 110(E) (including on this list of individuals the issuer,
board of directors, executives, general partners, employees, and any auditor or
accountant certifying the truthfulness of the prospectus). In harmony with the
American model, the signatories to the prospectus are potentially liable. Thus, one
can argue that the issuer's counsel is included in the list. Although not stated
expressly in the law, the auditor's liability can be limited only to the sections of the
prospectus he actually certified.
135. The standard of reasonableness for due diligence could be that of the
prudent man in the management of his property.
136. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 111(C). Most statutes of limitations
under the U.S. securities laws allow an action to be brought within one year from
discovery of untrue facts, but no more than three years from the date of occurrence
or event giving rise to the cause of action. See Lampf et al. v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 361 (1991).
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An important provision in the Securities Law provides for speedy
trials of securities cases by courts. 137 The speedy nature of securities
cases does not contradict the notion of due process. Indeed, in many
respects, it is far better than utilizing Jordan's normal adjudication
system, which is so slow that it precludes effective remedies in fastmoving markets such as the capital market. Investors should rest
easier knowing that all securities disputes will be treated
expeditiously.
The private right of action for violation of securities laws arises
out of specific legislative provisions that expressly give an individual
such a right. For example, the Securities Law provides no private
right of action for damages against the ASE for failure to enforce its
rules and regulations.138 The question remains, however, whether,
under the Jordanian Securities Law, a private right of action may
arise out of those provisions of the law that do not expressly give a
private plaintiff the right to sue but simply make certain activities
that have injured the plaintiff unlawful. Courts of other countries
have found an implied private right of action. "3 9 It is too difficult to
predict whether Jordanian courts will adopt implied private rights of
action for violations of the securities law.
1. Insider Trading and Market Manipulation
The offenses of insider trading and market manipulation are the
most detrimental to the creation of investor confidence in the capital
market and thus have been singled out in the Securities Law.14 0
137. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 113(A) (mandating that
enforcement of these decisions is also expeditious).
138. The reason for not holding the ASE liable is based on the fact that it is a
not-for-profit entity with extensive regulatory functions.
139. See Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (showing that U.S. courts have found an implied private right of
action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act); see also Case 26/62,
Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration], 1963 E.C.R. 1 (1963) (illustrating that the

European Court of Justice implied a private right of action under the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community and giving direct effect to the

treaty where the treaty itself did not provide for such a private right of action).
140. The are several bases for prohibiting insider trading: an ethical basis which
deems that allowing a select group of investors to acquire advantages simply by

virtue of their insider status is inherently unfair; and an economic rationale which
deems that unequal access to information will deter investors from entering a risky
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Article 108 deals exclusively with insider trading. This Article
prohibits capitalizing on nonpublic information through the purchase
or sale of securities resulting in unjust enrichment at the expense of
others.' 4 ' Although the law claims to regulate insider trading, it is
hard to understand how a single article can regulate such a complex
matter. The law fails to provide categories of insiders, such as
corporate insiders and temporary insiders.'42 The law does not
provide details as to the elements of an insider trading violation, such
as whether trading on the basis of inside information is dispositive,
whether and what defenses may be offered, and what activities by
analysts constitute insider trading. The law also fails to address the
presence of scienter and causation.
Anyone who violates the insider trading prohibition may be
imprisoned for up to three years. 143 However, convictions of insider
trading in Jordan are rare. The State did not convict anyone for
insider trading during the first five years the provision was in
effect.' 44 Not to mention, the Securities Law should be amended to
provide severe civil penalties. Moreover, the staff of the JSC and
prosecutors must be adequately trained to have the legal and
financial background to handle insider trading offences, which are
often very technical in nature.

market, inevitably resulting in the demise of the market. See JONATHAN R. MACEY,
INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 25 (1991); see also Emily
A. Malone, Note, Insider Trading: Why to Commit the Crime from a Legal and
PsychologicalPerspective, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 327, 337-38 (2003) (describing insider
trading as fundamentally unfair). Malone also discusses an interesting
counterargument to the notion that insider trading is unfair and harms shareholders
to whom the insider information is not available. Id.
141. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 108(B)(1); see id. art. 2 (providing a
definition as to insider information). Insider information is information relating to
one or several issuers or to one or several securities which has not been made
public and which, if it were made public, would likely affect the price of any such
security. Id. The definition of insider information does not include the debatable
issue of tentative information which includes estimates, projections, and opinions.
142. Corporate insiders traditionally include directors, officers, and other
employees of a company. Temporary insiders are those who perform services for a
public company where the relationship entails receipt of inside information that the
client expects to be kept confidential.
143. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 110(B)(1).
144. Telephone Interview with Rami Salah, Public Prosecutor of Northern
Amman, Court of Northern Amman (July 8, 2007).
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The Securities Law dedicates only one article to regulating market
manipulation which aims to create a false market of supply and
demand. 45 Manipulation not only affects the integrity of the market,
but is also contrary to the principles of a market economy in which
an equilibrium between supply and demand is sought. Securities
manipulation disrupts this equilibrium by sending signals that might
compel investors to react based on information that will ultimately
prove false.
The Securities Law provides that anyone who violates the market
46
manipulation prohibition may be imprisoned up to three years.1
This market manipulation provision is too widely drawn. It does not,
for example, exempt stabilization techniques. 47 Stabilization is
important for successful placement of securities. The law should
provide for such an exemption. In addition, the law should enumerate
the requirements for such exemptions, define the stabilizing period,
and establish a stabilization register.
Market manipulation cases could overlap with untrue statements
of material fact cases. However, there is a distinction between these
two cases. While civil liability for both cases requires harm to an
individual investor in buying or selling, or refraining from buying
and selling a security, criminal liability for market manipulation does

145. See Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 109 (suggesting that market

manipulation occurs through various means such as noisy trade-rumors or fads,
for example).
146. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art. 110(B)(1).
147. See Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market
for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REv. 965, 977-78 (1995) (referring to the
Exchange Act Release No. 2446 which describes stabilization as "the buying of a

security for the limited purpose of preventing or retarding a decline in its open
market price in order to facilitate its distribution to the public"). These authors
further contend:
Stabilization thus prevents any price downslide of the securities below issue
price during the issue period. As an example, in an IPO in which shares are
being sold at a fixed price of $20, the lead underwriter, on behalf of the
underwriting syndicate, would stabilize price by maintaining, during the
distribution, an offer to buy shares at the offering price. The bid keeps the
price of the stock from dropping, if demand is weak, below the offering price,

and thus creates the appearance that the issue is more desirable to the market
than it actually is.
Id. at 978. There are several practices associated with stabilization such as creating
artificial demand through buy-backs, ramping, and squeezing the shorts.
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not require any actual harm suffered by any investor; the act itself is
the crime.
The available literature suggests that the JSC rarely enforces the
prohibition against market manipulation. Whether this limited
application of the prohibition reflects enforcement difficulties or
model market behavior is debatable. Again, qualified personnel and
training are paramount for successful implementation of the
prohibition against market manipulation. The point here is that the
prohibition against market manipulation has not found its way into
practice. However, given the way in which legislators drafted the
market manipulation provision, it is hard to see how the JSC could
ever efficiently use it.
The Securities Law provides punishment for violating insider
trading and market manipulation prohibitions in the form of
imprisonment for up to three years.'48 In the very same provision, the
Securities Law provides a three-year prison sentence for any licensed
broker who sells any security without written authorization from its
owner.'49 Having uniform sanctions for these three violations
assumes that they are of the same nature and thus warrant a uniform
sanction. However, the Securities Law fails to take into account the
fact that insider trading and market manipulation can harm the
market substantially. On the other hand, the selling of a security by a
broker without written authorization does not have the same effect on
the market. Moreover, a law should not apply uniform sanctions for
one specific type of violation, but rather should take into account
that, in some cases, the violation may have been unintentional or in
good faith. The current version of the Securities Law contemplates
this reality, calling for different levels of sanctions for insider trading
and market manipulation depending on the gravity of these offenses.
Finally, the Securities Law does not provide a private right of
action for insider trading and market manipulation offenses. This
omission is not surprising in a law that deals with these complex
matters in a single article. Therefore, the Securities Law or its
implementing regulations should introduce a private right of action
against those who trade while in possession of insider information or
affect the price of a security through manipulative practices.
148. Securities Law for the Year 2002, art.I 10(B)(1).
149. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Jordanian government enacted the Securities Law of 2002 to
jumpstart its market and to attract investment that would transform
its economy into a major regional player. This was the first step
toward regulating the securities market. Much more must be done to
create an appropriate regulatory scheme. Countless regulations need
to be adopted to assure proper functioning of the market.
Although the internationalization of the Jordanian securities
market increases the availability of funds from foreign investors,
there could be drawbacks. This internationalization could increase
the exposure of investors who would reconsider their portfolio
investments if expected returns fall.
The Jordanian government should restructure the operation of its
stock market. As of now, trading occurs for a limited time, from 9:30
a.m. to 12:00 p.m. There is also a trading limit at the opening phase
of each day for the orderly clearing of outstanding orders prior to
fully opening the market. An afternoon session (from 12:30 p.m. to
2:30 p.m.) should be added, and expanded, later on. Ultimately, the
market should have continuous trading from 9:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
This way, Jordan will bring the hours of its securities market more in
line with other markets.
The Securities Law calls for the creation of a central authority, the
JSC, which acts pursuant to the legislative authority to control and
monitor issuer behavior. The JSC enjoys broad regulatory powers.
For example, it can develop rules on securities and oversee industry
professionals by issuing broker-dealer and other professional
licenses. The powers of the JSC in the enforcement area are,
however, less specific. Although the law does contain enforcement
provisions stipulating that the issuer and the issuer's management
bodies are responsible for the completeness and reliability of
information presented in required documents and subjecting them to
civil and criminal action, there is no indication that these provisions
will have any immediate impact on actual enforcement efforts. As
with the disclosure requirements generally, enforcement provisions
are critical and will play an important part in a regulatory scheme in
the long run.
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The JSC should establish an enforcement division responsible for
market surveillance. The JSC should staff this division with
inspectors and lawyers adequately trained and with the understanding
that it will increase staff numbers should the volume of trading
increase. The division will have to take a proactive approach toward
enforcement by attending trading sessions at the ASE, monitoring
public offerings, and responding to complaints from investors,
among other things.
The ASE, a self-regulatory organization, helps its participants with
on-the-ground knowledge to implement the most efficient and
effective rules possible. Self-regulation arguably is cost effective
because it fosters efficient rules and removes the expensive burden of
oversight from the government bureaucracies. However, the selfregulatory nature of the ASE could create conflicts of interest. There
could be lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to
be regulated and industry participants are inclined to advance their
interest through the imposition of poorly anti-competitive restraints
as opposed to those justified by regulatory needs. In addition, the
ASE generates its revenues through the imposition of listing and
annual fees. Thus, the financial interest of the ASE in continuing to
collect fees may lead to decreased regulatory zeal.
The disclosure requirements are not the last word on the disclosure
of material information about securities, rather it is a good start
toward creating an efficient securities market. Disclosures to
investors are now mandated only annually or semi-annually, and
even then are issued long after the year has ended. It appears that
detailed and vigorously enforced disclosure requirements can and
will assure that the investing public receives all necessary
information about the issuer and about the security being issued.
While the law defined the materiality concept, it is too vague a
concept to serve as the standard that governs the day-to-day conduct
of issuers in the real world. Therefore, Jordan should adopt a
categorical approach whereby it identifies categories of material
events requiring disclosure.
In the context of violations and penalties, the Securities Law is
silent as to the knowledge of truth by a purchaser at the time of
purchase as a defense to misrepresentation liability for the issuer.
Under the Jordanian Securities Law, a private right of action arises
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out of specific provisions. However, it remains unclear whether these
provisions implicitly give a private plaintiff a right to sue for other
unlawful activities that have injured the plaintiff.
Jordan needs to define specifically, rather than in general terms,
manipulative and fraudulent practices. The Jordanian Securities Law
or its implementing regulations should provide details as to the
elements of insider trading and market manipulation violations.
Moreover, the state should enforce the prohibition against insider
trading and market manipulation effectively. Sanctions against
insider trading and market manipulation violations should be
increased to be commensurate with the seriousness of these
violations and the effects they have on the market.
The Jordanian Securities Law drew on the expertise of wellknown and apparently successful foreign securities laws, specifically
those of the United States and the United Kingdom. For example,
securities laws in Jordan and the United States have mandatory
disclosure requirements on the distribution of securities to the public.
In spite of similarities between the securities laws of Jordan and the
United States, differences of varying degrees of significance remain.
For instance, the regulation of insider trading in Jordan is a much
more recent phenomenon than it has been in America. Borrowing
from other legal systems is typically more efficient than creating a
new model from the ground up and, as such, Jordan capitalized on
lessons already learned in the U.S. and other countries. However, it
is dangerous to assume that the regulatory systems appropriate for
the existing U.S. and U.K. markets are necessary or sufficient for
Jordan. The regulatory structures currently in use in those markets
are the result of evolution in response to changing conditions. The
key is to choose provisions that will permit the Jordanian market to
undergo its own evolution. For example, because there is only one
viable stock exchange in Jordan, it is not necessary or efficient for
broker-dealers to form an independent association at this point
because there is little role for such a body to play.
As the Jordanian capital market becomes increasingly complex
with the introduction of sophisticated financial instruments, and
advances in the use of electronic commerce, the regulator risks will
be marginalized unless it adapts to these changes. An effective
regulatory framework must be proactive, with the objective being to
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strike an appropriate balance between the often-competing interests
of protecting the investing public and allowing market forces to
dictate the speed and direction of healthy competition and
innovations. Jordan needs to strike the proper balance between overand under-regulation. Overly zealous regulation will have the
counter-effect of scaring off industry professionals, and will
ultimately destroy the securities market.
There must be a change in the culture of investing in the securities
market in Jordan. The population, unfamiliar with the workings of
the securities market, must gain an understanding of the process and
begin to develop a sense of true risk/reward decisions. Jordanian
markets should not be perceived as equivalent to gambling arenas.
Investors should come to the market for long-term serious
investments, not for the promise of quick, extremely advantageous
returns. Moreover, the government should constrain excessive
speculation in the Jordanian securities market through indirect means
such as taxation.
Certainly, the Jordanian market has a great deal to offer investors.
Investors want to maximize return on investment in securities and
minimize any risk, and only governmental regulation of the market
can give them such benefit. The present regulatory regime and
culture in Jordan needs further re-structuring. The process may take a
long time, but the legislation and regulations reviewed in this Article
demonstrate that Jordan is moving in the right direction.

